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Abstract 
 
 This is a corrigendum to Theorem 15 of Jackson and Swinkels (2005) [Existence of 
Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions, Econometrica, 73, 93-140], which 
proves the existence of equilibrium with positive probability of trade for private value 
auctions. 
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Jackson and Swinkels (2005) proved the existence of equilibrium with posi-
tive probability of trade for private value auctions (Theorem 15). This impor-
tant theorem was established with great ingenuity, but there is a slight error in
the last part of its proof, on p. 137. In the penultimate inequality, a δ appears
on the right hand side which is absent in the previous inequality. Thus, the
term ω
k
should be dropped from the right in the last inequality. This is not yet
sufficient to break the argument, but the observation that ζ can be bounded
above by 2M ω
k
is.
The following modification in the proof is sufficient. The definition of
the modified auction Ax, for x ∈ {3, 4, ...} is changed to the following: with
probability 1/x, a non-strategic player n + 1 has endowment en+1 = c and
submits c sell offers which are all equal to a random variable uniform on [w,w];
with probability 1/x, en+1 = 0 and n + 1 submits c buy offers which are all
equal to a random variable uniform in [w,w]. For such a game, most of the
arguments given in the original proof work without changes.1 The modification
is in what follows.
Since player in ix ∈ H is (occasionally) a buyer, there is a probability ζ > 0
that such a player has an endowment of at most c−1 units.2 Define E001 as the
event where QxB,n+1 > 0 and i
x has endowment of at most c− 1 units. Define
E01 and E1 as before. Again, we have Prx (E1) ≥ ζµˆx.3
If E1 = E01, i
x has no sell bids at or below w− 2δ and there is at least one
buy bid above w − 2δ. If E1 = E001 , ix has at most c− 1 sell bids at or below
w − 2δ (because she has only c− 1 units), while there are at least c buy bids
above w − 2δ. Then, under E1 ∩E2 ∩E3j, j sells at least one extra object by
dj.
The rest of the argument works.4
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1The limitation to the probability Pr x(QxB > c) was based on the argument that this
event will occur only if more than two players bid above w − 2δ. This remains true.
2Such ζ cannot be limited by 2M ω
k
as before.
3This limitation is also sufficient to use the consequences of (6). I thank Prof. Swinkels
for this observation.
4There is a typo in (5): the n in the right hand side should be n+1. Similar replacements
should be done in its consequences.
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